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JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Mary L. Volcansek*
INTRODUCTION
"American exceptionalism," a term coined by Seymour Martin Lip-
set, purports to explain why no socialist or other extreme labor move-
ment took hold in the United States as it did in other industrialized
countries,' but the notion that "Americanism" constitutes an ideology
can explain why so many other trends-political, social, cultural, or
economic-that can be found in other post-industrialized democracies
do not hold for the United States. That applies most aptly to our
mechanisms for naming judges to the bench. Only Bolivia2 and some
American states elect judges to office. Likewise, few nations allow
judges to serve their "life" terms beyond a fixed retirement age, un-
like the tenure of U.S. federal judges. Whereas the United States at
the federal level has enshrined independence as the paramount value
by giving judges life tenure, those states that retain elections have
made accountability their primary concern.3 If we look beyond
American borders, however, we find that other nations have fash-
ioned different systems, some that blend independence and accounta-
bility and others that focus solely on the training and qualifications of
judges.
Kate Malleson proposed a typology for judicial selection mecha-
nisms: executive appointment, career judiciary, elections (direct or in-
direct), judicial appointment commissions, and hybrid.4 Since judicial
elections are an American and now Bolivian peculiarity, this Article
proposes a different four-fold typology: executive appointment, career
* Professor of Political Science, Texas Christian University.
1. SEYMOUR MARTIN UPSET, AMERICAN EXCEITiONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SwORD
13-14 (1996).
2. See Bolivia: Double or Quits, THE ECoNOMIsT, Dec. 15-21, 2007, at 44.
3. See PHILIP L. DuBoIs, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 27-28 (1980).
4. Kate Malleson, Introduction, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 3, 3-4 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell
eds., 2006).
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or civil service judiciary, shared or parity appointments, and judicial
appointment commissions. Parity schemes are ones in which seats on
courts are apportioned on some basis, such as political party, geogra-
phy, ethnicity, or gender.5 Shared appointments, on the other hand,
place the authority to name judges to the bench in different institu-
tional hands, such as half named by the president and half by one
house of the legislature.6 Because of the ingenuity of those writing
national constitutions, the variety and mix-and-match quality of many
selection systems make some systems difficult to fit into any of these
generic categories.
II. EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT
Where the executive appoints judges, judicial independence must
be preserved through tenure in office. Some countries allow the exec-
utive unilaterally to name judges, but a number of variations on con-
sultation, recommendation, and confirmation are often imposed.
Executive appointment can probably be traced to early English prac-
tices when Henry II appointed judges, then called "commissioners," as
early as 1178.7 After the Magna Carta was signed in 1215, English
monarchs appointed judges from among people who knew the law,
and a professional judiciary emerged.8 Appointment by the Crown
eventually shifted to the hands of the lord chancellor and was often
quite partisan in the nineteenth century. 9 From 1876 to 1972, legal
and family status, along with political party, were the primary factors
driving who would be selected for appellate court positions.10 As a
result, until the later part of the twentieth century, appellate judges in
England were white males, and only 7% of them did not hold a pres-
tigious law degree from Cambridge or Oxford." Not surprisingly, this
meant that in most of the cases decided, the government and other
superior parties prevailed over individuals.12 Judges serving on the
5. Lee Epstein, Jack C. Knight, Jr. & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems,
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 12 (2001).
6. Mary L. Volcansek, Appointing Judges the European Way, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363, 377
(2007).
7. MARY L. VOLCANSEK ET AL., JUDICIAL MISCONDUcT: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON
68 (1996).
8. Id.
9. See C. Neal Tate, Recruitment to the British Appellate Judiciary, 1876-1972: Causal Models,
13 INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 249, 256-57 (1992).
10. Id. at 265.
11. Burton Atkins, Judicial Selection in Context: The American and English Experience, 77
Ky. L.J. 577, 595 (1988).
12. Id. at 612.
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courts of England and Wales had life tenure and "an adequate, if not
opulent, salary." 13
The English model obviously traveled to British colonies, and with
some variation it was adopted in the United States. Australia likewise
adopted executive appointment of judges but placed the authority in
the attorney general, who must "consult with the Attorneys-General
of the States." 14 Judges in Australia hold life tenure, but only until the
age of 70 since 1977.15 Australian judges may be removed by the gov-
ernor-general upon the recommendation of both houses of parlia-
ment, but this has never happened. 16 Other similar minor
modifications have been made, such as Canada's placement of the ap-
pointment authority in the cabinet upon recommendation by the min-
ister of justice for all but judges on the Canadian Supreme Court.17
New Zealand follows the English model, with the attorney general
recommending to the governor-general, who can independently make
appointments.1 8 The Indian cabinet could appoint judges with consul-
tation only with the chief justice of the Indian Supreme Court until a
1993 decision by that court that placed authority to name all judges in
a collegium of the supreme court.19
Use of executive appointment has traveled far from former British
colonies and found a home in many nations of Latin America. In
Mexico, for example, the Mexican Supreme Court has been named by
the president, and although a confirmation process existed, because of
one-party government and a strong executive, "virtually unchecked
presidential appointments to the Supreme Court" were the norm until
inter-party competition emerged in the late 1990s, and a 1994 reform
13. Robert Stevens, Judicial Independence in England: A Loss of Innocence, in JUDICIAL IN-
DEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE
WORLD 155, 159-61 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
14. John M. Williams, Judicial Independence in Australia, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE
AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 13, at
173, 176 (quoting High Court Act 1979, § 6 (Austl.)).
15. Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence:
Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 252 (2001).
16. Elizabeth Handsley, 'The Judicial Whisper Goes Around': Appointment of Judicial Of-
ficers in Australia, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 122, 122.
17. F.L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in Transition, in
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND
THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 56, 65.
18. James Allan, Judicial Appointments in New Zealand: If It Were Done When 'Tis Done,
Then 'Twere Well It Were Done Openly and Directly, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF
JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 103,
105.
19. S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 126, 295 (2002).
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required confirmation by a two-thirds majority in the senate.20 The
president also appointed all judges to the Argentine Supreme Court
until reforms in 1997,21 but prior to a regime change, court-packing
and forced resignations rendered so-called life tenure for judges to
just over five years on average.22
The Egyptian Constitutional Court, established in 1979, is popu-
lated by life-tenured judges appointed by the President from between
two nominees submitted by the chief justice and by the Egyptian Con-
stitutional Court as a whole.23 Appointments to the High Court of
Kenya are supposedly made by the president after screening by the
Judicial Service Commission, but "[t]he reality is that the Office of the
President together with the Chief Justice ... select the judges."24 Sim-
ilarly, both Tanzania and Zambia delegate to the president the ap-
pointment of the chief judge and one new judge on the highest court
at the beginning of the presidential term. In Tanzania, all other high-
est court judges are also named by the president but in consultation
with the chief justice; whereas in Zambia, the president's nominations
must be approved by parliament.25
Executive appointment of judges also occurs in some Asian nations.
The Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan has fifteen justices who serve
non-renewable eight-year terms, which allows each president to ap-
point half of the justices. 26 The justices are recommended to the pres-
ident by a nomination committee and must also be confirmed by the
legislature.27 Variations of executive appointment can also be found
in the Philippines,28 Russia, 29 Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 30
20. Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico, 32 J.
LAT. AM. STUD. 705, 713-14 (2000).
21. See Rebecca Bill ChAvez, The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in Argentina:
The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence, 49
LAT. AM. POL. & Soc'Y 33, 35-36 (2007).
22. Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argen-
tina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 291, 292 (2002).
23. Mahmoud M. Hamad, The Politics of Judicial Selection in Egypt, in APPOINTING JUDGES
IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra
note 4, at 260, 264.
24. Makau Mutua, Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya,
23 Hum. RTS. Q. 96, 104 (2001).
25. Siri Gloppen, The Accountability Function of the Courts in Tanzania and Zambia, in DE-
MOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 112, 124-25 (Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & Elin Skaar eds., 2004).
26. Tom GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 120 (2003).
27. Id.
28. David M. O'Brien, The Politics of Judicial Selection and Appointments in Japan and Ten
South and Southeast Asian Countries, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 355, 363.
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III. SHARED AND PARITY APPOINTMENTS
Shared appointment is most often reserved for the highest or consti-
tutional courts in a country and often overlaps with parity systems
whereby, usually through informal agreement, different partisan inter-
ests or other groups are allocated a certain number of seats. Austria
and Switzerland use a shared appointment system.31 Italy and Ger-
many, for example, both use blends of the two systems for appoint-
ments to their respective constitutional courts. In Germany, each of
the two houses of parliament is allotted half of the seats to fill on the
German Federal Constitutional Court.32 Because a two-thirds major-
ity is required in both houses, each of the two major parties agree to
select half of the judges and avoid legislative stalemate; minor parties
typically are delegated one seat by their larger coalition partner.33 It-
aly, on the other hand, divides appointment responsibility among
three different institutions: one-third is named by the head of state,
one-third by parliament, and one-third by the judges sitting on the
ordinary and administrative courts.34 Because a three-fifths majority
is required for the parliamentary appointees-something rarely
achievable in the fragmented Italian political system-the parties are
delegated a number of judgeships for both the parliamentary and
presidential appointees.35 Political upheaval in the 1990s altered that
practice, but it was resumed in the early part of the twenty-first cen-
tury.36 The judges are divided into three colleges to name their alloca-
tion to the Constitutional Court of Italy, which assures that different
elements in the broader judiciary are represented on the court.37 Sim-
ilar systems were adopted by Spain and Portugal when they returned
to democratic governance in the last half of the twentieth century.38
Forms of shared appointment exist outside of Europe. The Salva-
doran Supreme Court judges are elected by a two-thirds majority by
29. Alexei Trochev, Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in Russia, 38
LAw & Soc'Y REv. 513, 517 (2004).
30. A. E. Dick Howard, Judicial Independence in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TlE AGE OiF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM
AROUND TIII WORLD, supra note 13, at 89, 95.
31. Peter J. Van Koppen, The Dutch Supreme Court and Parliament: Political Decisionmaking
Versus Nonpolitical Appointments, 24 LAw & Soc'Y Ri~v. 745, 747, 750 (1990).
32. GEORG VANERG, TIHE PoLITics oF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 83 (2005).
33. Id. at 83-85.
34. MARY L. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL PoLITICS IN ITALY: TiHE CONSTITUTIONAL
CouRT 21 (2000).
35. Id. at 21-23.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 21.
38. See Volcansek, supra note 6, at 379.
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the legislative assembly, but nominations can only come from the gov-
erning body of the judiciary.39 The nine-member hybrid Mongolian
Tsets, which is intended to be both political and judicial and exercises
constitutional oversight, has one-third of its members nominated by
the president, one-third by the upper house of the legislature, and
one-third by the highest court; those nominations must all be con-
firmed by the upper legislative house.40 Even the People's Republic
of China employs a type of shared appointment in which all judges
who pass an examination and have the requisite legal experience are
recommended by the president of the court to which they aspire and
confirmed by the People's Congress.41
IV. CAREER/CIVIL SERVICE MODEL
The career or civil service model for selecting judges can be traced
to Napoleonic reforms in France in the early nineteenth century42 and
has served as the model for judiciaries in most civil law jurisdictions. 43
Potential judges take an examination upon completing their university
studies, or after having practiced law for a specified period of time,
and move over the course of their careers from the lowest courts to
higher ones based on some blend of merit and seniority. 44 Thus,
judges' entire socialization process and reference points are within the
confines of the professional judiciary.45 Variations on this model can
be found across continental Europe, the new European democracies,
much of Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
Even as the French system traveled elsewhere, it also underwent
reform at home. Since 1958, students who complete their four-year
university studies or lawyers and civil servants with at least five years
of experience can take the examination for admission to the Lcole
39. J. Michael Dodson & Donald W. Jackson, Judicial Independence and Instability in Central
America, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TIE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL P-RSPE1CIlVES
FROM AROUND TH1E WORLD, supra note 13, at 251, 257.
40. See GINSBURG, supra note 26, at 166-67.
41. Colin Hawes, Improving the Quality of the Judiciary in China: Recent Reforms to the Pro-
cedures for Appointing, Promoting, and Discharging Judges, in AtrOINTING JuoGs IN AN AGE
oF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECrIvEs FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 395,
400-01.
42. See MARY L. VOl-CANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL SEILEc-lON: THE
CRoss-EvoLuTION oF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACICES 111 (1988).
43. Accord Doris Marie Provine & Antoine Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France:
Searching for a New Legitimacy, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITI-
CAL PERSPECrlVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 176, 177.
44. CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, TmIE POWER OF JUDGEs: A CoMPARATIvE
StDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 34 (C.A. Thomas ed., 2002).
45. Id. at 18-20.
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nationale de la Magistrature (ENM), or the National School for the
Judiciary, where they study for almost three years.46 During their
time at the ENM, students are paid auditor judges, and the curriculum
includes coursework and a series of internships. 47 After completion of
the ENM, students once again take an examination that serves to
place them on the court where they begin their careers. 48 Another
feature of the French civil service system is the Superior Council of
the Magistrature (CSM), which exercises authority over appoint-
ments, discipline, promotions, and transfers and consists of both pros-
ecutors and judges, along with the minister of justice and laypeople
appointed by parliament.49
Parallel civil service models can be found all over Europe, but each
has modified the French version in some fashion. In Germany, for
example, entering the ranks of the judiciary is more difficult, requiring
an entrance exam to enter the judicial school and another one upon
completion, but only those passing the second exam with high honors
can obtain positions on the lowest rung of the judiciary.50 The
Netherlands uses a similar scheme in which new law graduates and
those with six years of legal practice can enter a six-year training pro-
gram to become judges and are assessed psychologically as well as by
performance in interviews.5' The Danes, on the other hand, require
that aspiring judges complete a master's degree in law with high
grades and then four years of training, followed by another eight to
eleven years of service as a deputy judge; only then can a judge be
permitted to work with two other judges for nine months, and if evalu-
ated highly, apply to sit as a major trial court judge. 52 In France,
Spain, Portugal, and Germany, promotion is based on merit,53 but in
Italy seniority is the sole criterion.54
The civil service model can be found far from its origins in Western
Europe. Japan may have one of the most rigorous versions of it. All
46. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 42, at 129-30.
47. Provine & Garapon, supra note 43, at 183.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 184.
50. Donald P. Kommers, Autonomy Versus Accountability: The German Judiciary, in Jul-i
CIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THF AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE
WORLD, supra note 13, at 131, 143.
51. Leny E. de Groot-Van Leeuwen, Merit Selection and Diversity in the Dutch Judiciary, in
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN ACE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECFIVES FROM AROUND
THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 145, 150.
52. Eva Smith, Case Assignment in Danish Courts, in THE RIGHT JUDGE FOR EACH! CASE 85,
87 (Philip M. Langbroek & Marco Fabri eds., 2007).
53. See GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI-, supra note 44, at 46.
54. VOLCANSEK, supra note 34, at 21.
2011] 811
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
aspiring judges other than those on the Supreme Court of Japan take
a rigorous multiple choice test that is passed by only about 700 of the
approximately 20,000 who sit for it each year.55 Those who pass must
then submit a thesis and undergo an interview to be admitted into a
two-year training program, followed by a ten-year probationary ap-
prenticeship.56 Even when that is successfully completed, Japanese
judges must be re-appointed every ten years and promotions are
based strictly on merit.5 7 The Pakistani version of a civil service
model shares many of the same elements of interviews and examina-
tions, but members of the legal profession with at least ten years of
experience can be appointed even to higher courts.58 Thailand, Nepal,
Singapore, Indonesia, and Bangladesh also all use variations on the
civil service model, but codes of judicial ethics, for example, are so
laxly enforced in Thailand that the judiciary there is regarded as "one
of the most corrupt in South and Southeast Asia." 59
Because of earlier European domination, many parts of Africa and
the Middle East follow the French civil code and mimic the French
model of judicial recruitment combined with an overlay of local polit-
ics and Islamic culture.60 In Egypt, for example, there exists the famil-
iar course of attending a university followed by an examination and
merit-based promotions through the ranks of the courts, but two addi-
tional requirements are imposed: first, that one come from a "suitable
family background" and second, that no "immediate relatives should
have been accused of anti-regime sentiments or activities." 6 1
V. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT COMMISSIONS
Kate Malleson remarked that judicial appointment commissions
"look likely to become the most popular selection system of the
twenty-first century" as a solution to the problem of balancing judicial
independence and accountability. 62 Although Americans tie merit se-
lection to the so-called Missouri Plan, 63 other nations have imple-
mented the system, and some did so quite early. Most recently, merit
55. David M. O'Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial Independence from Within: The Jap-
anese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THn AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CREICAL. PERSPEC-
rivrs FROm AROUND mE WORLD, supra note 13, at 37, 45.
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id. at 45-46.
58. See O'Brien, supra note 28, at 358.
59. Id. at 363.
60. Nathan J. Brown, Law and Imperialism: Egypt in Comparative Perspective, 29 LAw &
Soc'y Riv. 103, 116-18 (1995).
61. Hamad, supra note 23, at 263.
62. Malleson, supra note 4, at 6.
63. Dunois, supra note 3, at 4-5.
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selection has been adopted in England and Wales,64 but it could be
found in Israel since passage of the 1953 Judges Law. 6 5 A judicial
elections committee in Israel, consisting of the president of the su-
preme court, two other members of the court, the minister of justice,
another cabinet member, two members of the Knesset (one tradition-
ally from the opposition party), and two representatives of the Israeli
bar make all judicial appointments.66 The members of the bar are
elected by the council of the bar, and representatives from the legisla-
ture are elected by their fellow legislators.67 Individuals may be nomi-
nated for consideration by the minister of justice, the president of the
supreme court, or any three members of the committee; but in reality,
the ones on whom the minister of justice and the president of the su-
preme court agree are those who win the appointments.68 Notably,
Israel alone allows the selection committee to actually make the ap-
pointment rather than recommend nominees to another person or in-
stitution, and all judges serve for life until the mandatory retirement
age of seventy.69
The allure of judicial appointment commissions arises from their
seemingly apolitical character and has, as a result, been transplanted
in a number of countries that democratized or redemocratized at the
end of the twentieth century. However, use of appointment commis-
sions has not always insulated judges from threats to their indepen-
dence. Bulgaria serves as an illustrative case. All judges except those
on the constitutional court are selected through a commission system
and granted life tenure until the mandatory retirement age, 70 but that
has not prevented intrusive phone calls, physical threats, and even in-
timidation by prosecutors and the chairs of judges' own courts.71 Ap-
pointment commissions are also used in Lithuania, Poland, and
Romania, where the commissions provide a list of nominees to the
executive for appointment. 72
64. See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 27 (Eng.).
65. See Martin Edelman, The Judicial Elite of Israel, 13 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 235, 238 (1992).
66. Yoav Dotan, Judicial Accountability in Israel: The High Court of Justice and the Phenome-
non of Judicial Hyperactivism, 8 ISRAEL AFF. 87, 92 (2002).
67. See id.
68. Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel: Constitution, Law and
Politics, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM
AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 241, 249.
69. Edelman, supra note 65, at 237.
70. Howard, supra note 30, at 95.
71. Bruno Schonfelder, Judicial Independence in Bulgaria: A Tale of Splendour and Misery, 57
EUROPE-ASIA STUD. 61, 65 (2005).
72. Howard, supra note 30, at 95.
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Since the mid-1980s, judicial appointment systems have also existed
in many parts of Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Mexico, Panama, and Paraguay) but also have not served to de-politi-
cize the judiciary; indeed, the commissions often become politicized
themselves.73 The Venezuelan commission that was instituted in 1969
became so politicized that it was finally eliminated in 2000.74 As part
of a constitutional reform in 1994, Argentina adopted a judicial ap-
pointments commission to name all judges except those on its highest
court. The commission of twenty people was composed of representa-
tives of the legislature (including the opposition party), executive,
members of the judiciary, lawyers, and academics, who all screened
candidates through examinations and interviews. The process was so
slow and cumbersome, however, that in 2006 the membership was re-
duced to thirteen and the number of politicians relative to others in-
creased.75 Until the constitutional change initiated by Ivo Morales,76
Bolivian commissions were composed of four members of the legisla-
ture and the chief justice of the highest court.77
Judicial appointment commissions have also been adopted in a
number of African nations. The 1996 post-apartheid South African
constitution uses an appointments commission that recommends a list
of candidates to the executive, but allegedly the commission is quite
partisan.78 For the highest courts, the commission is merely advisory,
and the executive can name whomever he chooses. 79 In Namibia, a
similar arrangement is used, but ethnic diversity is a stated goal, along
with legal credentials, for the selection.80 Under the Robert Mugabe
regime in Zimbabwe, the president consults with the judicial commis-
sion and always follows its recommendations, but that happens be-
cause the minister of justice only presents nominees to the
73. See Chivez, supra note 21, at 34-35.
74. See id. at 35.
75. See id. at 40-42.
76. See Bolivia: Double or Quits, supra note 2, at 44.
77. Anibal Pdrez-Lifidn, Barry Ames & Mitchell A. Seligson, Strategy, Careers, and Judicial
Decisions: Lessons from the Bolivian Courts, 68 J. POL. 284, 287 (2006).
78. See Stacia L. Haynie, Courts and Revolution: Independence and Legitimacy in the New
Republic of South Africa, 19 JUST. Sys. J. 167, 170-71 (1997).
79. Hugh Corder, Seeking Social Justice? Judicial Independence and Responsiveness in a
Changing South Africa, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 13, at 194, 196-97.
80. Sufian Hemed Bukurura, A Judiciary in Transition: Reflections on the Selection of Judges
in Namibia, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 313, 318-22.
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commission who are acceptable to the president, and the president
directly appoints the majority of the commission.81
No Western European nation used a judicial appointments commis-
sion until Scotland adopted one in 2002,82 but the judiciary of England
and Wales followed suit in 2006.83 The fifteen-member commission
recommends to the lord chancellor who makes the appointments in
the name of the Crown. Two judges serve on the commission with
eleven lay members who are named through an open competition by
an independent panel.84 With this change, the nation that pioneered
executive appointment of judges removed the appointing authority
from the lord chancellor for the first time in more than 900 years.
VI. THE ALLURES OF DIFFERENT SYSTEMS
Executive appointment of judges theoretically fixes political ac-
countability for the quality of the judiciary. This supposes that the
electorate will vote out an executive who appoints corrupt, incompe-
tent, or otherwise flawed individuals to the bench. That supposition is
tenuous at best, even where healthy two-party competition exists, and
certainly is doubtful where one party dominates in elections. Judicial
independence can, moreover, be jeopardized if the judge is not inde-
pendent "from those to whom the judge owes his office."85 To
counter allegations of judicial dependence in systems of executive ap-
pointment, tenure in office becomes paramount. Thus, in the United
States, which uses executive appointment albeit with Senate confirma-
tion, judges hold office for life. However, beyond U.S. shores, life
tenure does not necessarily really mean life tenure. Indeed, many av-
enues exist to remove or neutralize judges who behave too
independently.
Career or civil service models foster professionalism among judges.
Judges are professionally trained and are insulated from political pres-
sures. The entire socialization process of judges under this system is
within the judicial corps and allegiance is to the judiciary. Even so,
other influences or even corrupt motives can creep into the judicial
ranks. More troublesome, though, is the lack of accountability that
81. Derek Matyszak, Creating a Compliant Judiciary in Zimbabwe, 2000-2003, in APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD,
supra note 4, at 331, 333-35.
82. Alan Paterson, The Scottish Judicial Appointments Board: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND
THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 13, 14.
83. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 27, sch. 8 (Eng.).
84. Id.
85. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 20 (1981).
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pervades civil service models of the judiciary. Judicial councils along
the lines of the French Superior Council of the Magistrature typically
hold the authority to discipline judges, but instances of actual removal
are rare,86 and appeals are the only avenue for correcting improper
applications of the law.8 7 Finally, civil service models as government
bureaucracies typically lack attractive salaries and the prestige that
tend to be associated with judgeships.
Shared and parity appointment systems are typically reserved for
the highest courts in a nation, and judges selected in this manner typi-
cally serve for fixed terms ranging from six to twelve years. The virtue
of parity appointment schemes lies in their ensuring a blend of ideo-
logical or political persuasions on a court by virtue of permitting dif-
ferent political parties or religious, ethnic, or linguistic groups
representation on the judicial body. A political equilibrium can be
guaranteed. Shared appointments, even when they do not overlap
with parity systems, have a stronger likelihood of also bringing some
measure of diversity in thought and political persuasion to the bench.
Of course, political equilibrium and ideological balance in either sys-
tem occur only if one party does not dominate all of the appointing
bodies and if political compromise must be reached to avoid stale-
mate. In other words, healthy inter-party competition and alternation
in power are central to the effectiveness of shared and parity appoint-
ment schemes.
The appeal of judicial appointment commissions is obvious: their
use permits at least the veneer of being apolitical. Judges are, at least
in theory, selected based on their merit as assessed by a commission
representing diverse constituencies. Notably, though, only in Israel
can the commission make the appointment as opposed to merely rec-
ommending nominees to someone-usually the executive-to make
the final selection. Or, as was the case in Zimbabwe, the president
can always follow the commission's recommendation because the
president appoints the commission, and all candidates presented to
the commission have already been vetted to assure that they would be
acceptable to the president.88 In Zimbabwe, in fact, should judges
prove not to be sufficiently subservient to the executive, they can be
removed by an investigating committee, also appointed by the presi-
dent and acting in private. 89 Judicial appointment commissions, like
86. See VOLCANSEK, supra note 7, at 40-41.
87. See DANIELA PIANA, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILMES IN NEw EUROPE 22-23 (2010).
88. Matyszak, supra note 81, at 333-35.
89. Id.
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those in some Latin American nations 90 and South Africa,91 can them-
selves become politicized. Commission recommendations cease in
those circumstances to recognize merit and instead reflect the pursuit
of some other political agenda.
Judicial appointment commissions also offer appointing officials-
usually the executive-political cover. Should a judge prove to be bi-
ased, incompetent, or otherwise undesirable, executives can explain
that they merely followed the recommendations of the commission
and are not responsible. Further, as was demonstrated in the case of
Bulgaria in its first years of the democratization process, even merito-
rious judges appointed through commission systems may still be sub-
jected to extra-legal influences once on the bench.92
VII. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
No ideal judicial selection mechanism has been designed, and each
model has flaws that can be exploited for partisan or other gains.
Many states in the United States have adopted judicial appointment
commissions to name judges for at least some levels of courts, and
some retain executive or legislative appointment systems. However,
judicial elections, whether partisan or nonpartisan, are used in thirty-
one states.93 This phenomenon, like true life tenure beyond a
mandatory retirement age for U.S. federal judges, has not been widely
imitated abroad. Interestingly, however, established democracies
where judicial activism is perceived are seeking "to increase judicial
accountability by strengthening the link to the electoral process while
avoiding the creation, strengthening, or revival of partisan political
control."94 In fact, a 2002 Canadian opinion poll indicated a prefer-
ence for popular election of judges.95 Judicial elections have been
strongly criticized in the United States, however, as not attracting the
best legal talent, interfering with judicial independence, and serving
only as an ineffective means for popular control.96 A recent study
looking at elections for state supreme courts purports to "debunk"
those assertions. 97
90. See Chivez, supra note 21, at 34.
91. See Haynie, supra note 78, at 170-71.
92. See Schonfelder, supra note 71, at 65.
93. LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 107 (6th ed. 2008).
94. Malleson, supra note 4, at 4.
95. See Morton, supra note 17, at 56.
96. DUBoIS, supra note 3, at 7-8.
97. See CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
128-39 (2009).
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Part of the argument against judicial elections involves injecting
politics into judicial selection and into judicial decisions. Yet politics
of some sort is involved in each of the selection systems covered in
this Article. "[O]ur choice is between a process in which the politics is
open, acknowledged, and possesses some degree of balance," accord-
ing to Peter Russell, "or a system in which political power and influ-
ence is masked, unacknowledged, and unilateral."98 Executive
appointments, parity and shared appointment systems, civil or career
service models, and judicial appointment commissions all have the po-
tential to be tainted by partisan politics.
Whereas the selection schemes adopted in American states attempt
to balance accountability of those on the bench with judicial indepen-
dence, other nations have focused more directly on the judicial-inde-
pendence side of the scale. Career or civil service models probably
achieve the greatest insulation of the judiciary from outside political
forces, but the Japanese example of hierarchical tyranny to impose
conformity in the judiciary reveals the potential flaw in that system.99
Experiences in the Italian judicial corps suggest another potential fail-
ing of the career service model. The Italian "ordinary judiciary"100 is
unionized, as might be expected in a civil service model, but the na-
tional magistrates union also has four or more groupings within it that
each reflect different ideological persuasions. 101
Straight executive appointment elsewhere, as in the United States,
permits overt partisan appointments and, where no confirmation pro-
cess is involved (for example, in Mexico prior to the 1996 reform),
appointments can be blatantly intended to strengthen a political
party's position or to insure judicial subservience to presidential poli-
cies. Shared and parity appointments, on the other hand, are intended
to guarantee that more than one political viewpoint will be repre-
sented on the bench.
Other countries have found that means exist to hold judges ac-
countable to entities other than the electorate. The appellate process
and judicial review, where it is permitted, as well as the shared sociali-
zation of legal studies work to ensure legal accountability. Recruit-
ment, selection, and promotion are only one component of obtaining
judicial independence; judicial training, disciplinary control, and re-
98. Peter H. Russell, Conclusion, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 4, at 420, 420.
99. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN wITH YASUO OHKOSHI, To DREAM OF DREAMS: RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN POSTWAR JAPAN 71 (1996).
100. The "ordinary judiciary" refers to judges who handle normal civil and criminal cases; it is
distinguishable from the administrative judiciary and the constitutional court.
101. See GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra note 44, at 56.
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moval mechanisms offer accountability while at the same time foster-
ing judicial independence. Professional accountability resides in
judicial ethics, judicial training, and evaluations made by peers and
practicing attorneys.102 Judicial audiences for American judges-col-
leagues, the public, other branches of government, professional
groups, policy groups, and the media-influence how judges behave
and check excesses. 103 Accountability can be achieved separately
from the ballot box.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be gleaned from judicial se-
lection practices in other countries comes not from the design of a
selection process but rather from the larger political context. Power
relationships in the larger political regime that are determined by
levels of inter-party political competition can exert the same influence
on the composition of the judiciary as parity appointment arrange-
ments do. Ideally, multiple political persuasions should be repre-
sented on the bench, particularly on collegial courts, and judicial
independence must be protected from political influence. The Pris-
oner's Dilemma as conceived by Mark Ramseyer with regard to judi-
cial independence illustrates this point. If rational politicians expect
to play indefinitely, they may or may not keep a judiciary indepen-
dent, and from the perspective of judicial selection, they will want par-
tisan supporters on the bench. When politicians expect to win
elections continuously, they have no incentive to honor judicial inde-
pendence. However, if they anticipate losing future elections, they are
more inclined to support judicial independence.10 4
Extrapolating from Ramseyer's Prisoner's Dilemma for judicial in-
dependence, whether judges are appointed, elected, or come to the
bench through merit selection, greater political balance and equilib-
rium will be achieved when politicians and political parties must antic-
ipate losing elections. The independence of judges depends, in other
words, "primarily on electoral probabilities."10 5 When political par-
ties alternate in power, judicial independence will be more secure,106
and the composition of the bench will be more balanced. That premise
applies across the selection systems used elsewhere in the world, as
well as to the U.S. federal system and the various schemes employed
by the states. The key to having a meritorious, politically diverse judi-
102. See PIANA, supra note 87, at 22.
103. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECtIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006).
104. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 722 (1994).
105. Id. at 743.
106. Id at 747.
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ciary depends less on the judicial selection system devised and more
on the dispersal of political power. 07 Perhaps the United States is
less "exceptional" than it appears at first glance.
107. Accord REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: JUDI-
CIAL POLITICS IN ARGENTINA 157 (2004).
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